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Abstract 
The legislature is one of the key institutions in the democratic process, to the extent that any 
attack on its composition or functioning is seen as a blow against democracy. This is premised on 
the fact that it symbolizes democracy and avails the people the opportunity to participate in 
governance. However, there have been allegations of misuse of powers and gross misconduct by 
members of the Nigerian National Assembly which have led to the calls for its scraping or total 
reformation. It is against this backdrop that this paper examines the utility of the National 
Assembly in the democratic process in Nigeria. The paper uses two parameters: indispensable 
functions of the legislature and the institution’s impact in entrenching good governance in the 
country. Using the descriptive method, the paper examines the role of the National Assembly in 
Nigeria’s democratic process to determine its indispensability or otherwise. The paper found that 
though there are numerous issues that need to be resolved, the National Assembly is too weighty 
to be discarded. As a result of this, it encourages the Nigerian legislators should avoid 
unnecessary confrontation with the executive arm and improve on legislative-constituency 
relations to make the institution more effective. 
 
Keywords: Legislature, National Assembly, democracy, good governance, legislative-executive 
relations. 
 
 
Introduction: 
The Indispensability of the Legislature in a Democratic Process 
 
All democratic institutions and features exist in other forms of 
undemocratic regimes, all except the legislature. The legislature is central and is 
at the heart of democracy to the extent that it is the only institution of  
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government that symbolizes democracy. Its inviolability is seen on the grounds 
that any attack on the composition or functioning of the legislature is seen as a 
blow against democracy. The sweeping wave of democratization is made 
popular and enjoys the support of the people across the globe because it makes 
provisions for people’s assembly, which other forms of government fail to 
provide. It affords the people the opportunity to participate in politics and 
governance by constitutionally entrenching their rights to vote and be voted for. 
As a result of the largeness of countries, which makes it practically impossible 
for all people to directly participate in governance, the legislature allows them 
to select, nominate and in most cases, elect representatives to the legislature to 
represent the interests of all the communities that make up the modern countries 
both in urban and rural areas. While it is difficult for the people (especially 
those inthe rural areas) to access the executive and judiciary, the legislature is 
quite accessible to all by virtue of the proximity of legislators to the grassroots. 
Through this, legislators serve as an important link between the people and 
governments.  
Several studies have established that the legislature occupies a central 
position in any democratic administration.
1
 Most scholars have premised their 
positions on the indispensability of the roles played by the legislature in 
ensuring good governance and the subsequent sustainability of the democratic 
project from external intruder (the military and rebel forces) especially in 
developing democracies. The structures and institutions of democracy, whether 
developed or developing, are built around the legislature. This is why the 
legislature is often said to epitomize the existence of democracy in a polity.
2
 
Perhaps this is why Sha
3
 has posited that the legislature is an indispensable 
institution that all democratic countries must build and maintain. One cannot 
agree less with this assertion on the ground that it is inconceivable to have 
democracy without the legislature. This is premised on the fact that the 
legislature epitomizes the existence of democracy.  
                                               
1  David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974); Craig C. Volden and Alan E. Wiseman, “The Lawmakers,” accessed July 13, 2013, 
http://polisci.emory.edu/home/cslpe/conference_2013/papers/Craig_Volden_Ch2_Ch4.pdf; 
Mojeed O. Alabi and Yinka J. Fashagba, “The legislature and anti-corruption crusade under 
the Fourth Republic of Nigeria: Constitutional imperatives and practical realities,” International 
Journal of Politics and Good Governance1, no. 1 (Quarter II, 2010): 1189 – 1195; Hassan A. 
Saliu and Alada A. Muhammad, “Exploring the Parliament,” Nigerian Journal of Legislative 
Affairs 3, no. 1&2 (2010): 73-89. Carol S. Weissert, “Issue Salience and State Legislative 
Effectiveness,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 16, no. 4(1991): 509-520. 
2  Steven M. Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 17, 
no.1 (2006): 5-20, accessed February 10, 2019, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
pdf/oppd/page_8/stronger _legislature_stronger_democracies.pdf.  
3  Pam D. Sha, “Duties and Responsibilities of Principal Functionaries of the Legislature,” 
in Legislators and the Legislature: A Guide for Legislators in Nigeria, ed. S. G. Tyoden 
(Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 2014). 
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Despite the convergence of opinions on the indispensability of the 
legislature in a democratic process, there is a subtle divergent argument in the 
democratic studies on the exact power and position of the legislature in relation 
to other arms of government. Since democracy is built on constitutionalism, the 
variations in the constitutional designs adopted by countries have prompted the 
argument along the three major constitutional designs/systems (parliamentary, 
presidential, and semi-presidential). The basis of the divergence of opinions is 
anchored on the superiority of the legislature and the executive on one hand and 
the complementary nature of their relationship on the other.  
The advocates of the parliamentary system have argued that the 
legislature gave birth to the executive since the Prime Minister and his cabinet 
is hitherto members of the parliament and serves at the pleasure of the 
Assembly.
4
 In contrast, Horowitz
5
 and Mainwaring and Shugart,
6
 who are 
advocates of the presidential system, opined that the legislature is important and 
powerful but not superior to the executive because the latter is directly elected 
and responsible to the people. The proponents and advocates of the third school 
(the semi-presidentialism, sometimes called a “dual” or “mixed” system) tend to 
balance the superiority argument of the other two schools. Duverger
7
 has called 
for a mutual control of governance apparatus by both the executive and the 
legislature. He called for absolute adherence to the theory of separation of 
powers and that the people should have the final decisive voice since they select 
or elect both the president and members of the parliament. On another separate 
ground, while the said debate has yielded some very useful insights, Fish
8
 
argued that it has also been largely inconclusive. On his part, he submitted that 
evidence has shown that “the presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed 
blessing for democratization.”
9
 Therefore, while admitting the indispensability 
of the legislature, the major concern should be on how effective the institution is 
performing its functions in entrenching good governance. 
The legislature across the globe performs four cardinal functions: 
lawmaking, representation, oversight, and budgeting. The legislature makes 
laws for the good governance of the polity, represents the people’s interest in 
                                               
4  Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic 
Consolidation,” World Politics 46 (1993): 1-22; Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The 
Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994). 
5  Donald L. Horowitz, “Comparing Democratic Systems” in The Global Resurgence of 
Democracy, ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996). 
6  Scot Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, Presidential Democracy in Latin America 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
7 Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government,” 
European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980): 165-187. 
8  Fish, “Stronger Legislatures,” 5. 
9  Ibid., 10. 
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the government, performs oversight functions on the executive to prevent 
democratic tyrannical tendencies, and also guards the guardians of the treasury 
by appropriating money for the running of government businesses. Aside from 
these, each country’s legislature performs other functions as conferred on it by 
the country’s constitution. For instance, Section 88 of the Nigerian 1999 
constitution (as amended) confers investigative functions and responsibilities on 
the National Assembly. The constitution also charges the National Assembly to 
receive and enquire into Public Petitions and Complaints brought to its 
attention. In the same vein, section 8 of the 1787 United States Constitution 
granted legislative powers to the Congress on the four core functions and other 
matters ranging from collection of taxes, the constitution of tribunals inferior to 
the Supreme Court, and military deployment, among other powers and 
functions. 
The critical nature of these functions to good governance makes the 
legislature to be an indispensable force in any pro-people democratic regime. 
However, there have been allegations of misuse of powers and gross 
misconduct levied against members of the legislature, especially in Nigeria.
10
 
The perception of the people about the National Assembly is quite disturbing 
and this has necessitated the call for its reformation. The allegations range from 
legislative corruption, insensitivity of the legislators to the constituents’ 
problems, flamboyant lifestyles despite the daunting recession rocking the 
economy, flagrant disregard for people’s agitations, self-centredness and 
dereliction of duties, among others. To this end, many people believe that the 
National Assembly is the root cause of all governance problems in Nigeria. The 
popular notion, therefore, is that once the legislature is fixed, the challenges 
facing the country will naturally be fixed. In view of these, several agitations 
are on the table on the fate of the National Assembly in the democratic process 
in Nigeria. While some have called for its total overhaul by turning it to a part-
time job, some other people even have called for its scrapping. 
It is against this backdrop that this paper examines the utility of the 
National Assembly in the democratic process in Nigeria. The paper uses two 
parameters: indispensable functions of the legislature and the institution’s 
impact in entrenching good governance in the country. While the first parameter 
deals with the weightiness of the National Assembly against its reformative 
agitations, the second parameter weighs up the problematic of retaining the 
institution from the perspective of its expensiveness to maintain which has 
                                               
10  Albert T. Sam-Tsokwa and Christopher Ochanja Ngara “The National Assembly and the 
Budget Process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Tackling the Challenges of Timeliness,” 
Canadian Social Science vol. 12, no. 5 (2016): 1-7; Hon S A Kawu Sumaila, “Nigerian 
Parliament: Challenges and Prospects.” Being Text of a Paper Delivered on the Occasion 
of the Post Matriculation Lectures for Matriculating Students of Bayero Univesity, Kano, 
Organized by the Student Union Government, June 12, 2013. 
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warranted its negative public perception. The main objective of the paper is to 
examine the role of the National Assembly in Nigeria’s democratic process with 
a view to determining its indispensability or otherwise. Other objectives are to: 
explore the institutional framework of the National Assembly in order to 
understand its place in Nigeria’s democratic process and to analyze the 
conflicting positions on the actual remuneration of the Nigerian legislators. In 
achieving these objectives, the paper is divided into six sections. The first 
section is the introduction. The second section explores the historical 
development of legislature in Nigeria and the institutional framework of the 
National Assembly in the democratic process. The third section examines the 
impact of the National Assembly on Nigeria’s democratic process in the Fourth 
Republic. Section four of the paper assessed the two contending arguments in 
favour of the calls to discard and/or retain the National Assembly as the 
country’s national legislature. Section five of the paperbriefly highlights the 
factorsresponsible for the negative public perception facing the National 
Assembly in Nigeria and the paperends with recommendations and conclusion. 
 
 
Historical Overview and Institutional Framework of the 
National Assembly in Nigeria’s Democratic Process 
 
Nigeria’s formal experience of legislative politics dates back to the 
colonial era. Although, there isevidence to suggest that there were elements of 
legislative activities (especially lawmaking and oversight) long before the 
advent of colonialism. Best
11
 attested to this when he noted that kingdoms such 
as Kanem-Borno empire, Sokoto caliphate, and Oyo empire, among others, had 
legislative processes in their traditional administrative systems. During the pre-
colonial era, all powers were centrally vested in Kings (fusion of power), but 
legislative functions were noticeable in the Councils. However, the first formal 
legislature established by the British colonial government was the Lagos 
Legislative Council in 1862 when Lagos was declared a Crown Colony.
12
 The 
Council was headed by the Governor who also doubled as the executive head 
and the essence of the Council was to adviseand assists the Governor of the 
Colony.
13
 However, the development of a national legislature began with the 
abolition of the Lagos Legislative Council and the establishment of the 
                                               
11  Shadrack G.Best, “The Legislature in a Democratic Setting,” in Legislators and the 
Legislature: A Guide for Legislators in Nigeria, ed. Sonni G. Tyoden (Kuru: National 
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 2014). 
12  Hanibal Goitom, “National Parliaments: Nigeria,” accessed November 3, 2017, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-parliaments/nigeria.php. 
13  Timothy I. Ojo, “Nigerian legislature: Historical survey of colonial administration before 
independence,” accessed March 21, 2019,  https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-
parliaments/nigeria.php. 
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“Legislative Council” in 1922; an institution made up of forty-six members 
including six Nigerians to legislate for Lagos and Southern Provinces.
14
 The 
emergence of the national legislature was unconnected with the agitations of the 
National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), a body established in 
1920 in Gold Coast (now Ghana) as an umbrella body for all nationalists across 
the four British colonies (Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone) in the 
region.
15
 It was made up of educated nationalists from British West African 
countries that felt dissatisfied with the legislative structure in the region and 
demanded for greater participation of Africans in the administration of their 
countries.
16
 In 1946, Sir Arthur Frederick Richards through the Nigeria 
(Legislative Council) Order-in-Council of 1946 reviewed and established a new 
national legislature still known as the Legislative Council but different in terms 
of membership composition. For the first time in the history of the country, the 
new Legislative Council was empowered to legislate for the whole country.
17
 
In 1951, based on the recommendations of the 1950 Hugh Foot-led 
Ibadan conference, Sir John Stuart Macpherson through the Nigeria 
(Constitution) Order-in-Council of 1951 abolished the Legislative Council and 
established a new central legislature known as the “House of Representatives.”
18
 
The House of Representatives continued to serve as the only central legislature 
(though with amendments in membership composition and electoral method by 
Oliver Lyttelton in 1954) until 1959. when the Nigerian Senate was established 
bringing about the adoption of a bicameral legislature in the country. In 1960, 
the independent Nigeria borrowed a leaf from Britain by adopting a 
parliamentary system of government with two chambers known as the House of 
Representatives and the House of Senate. However, the military intervention in 
Nigerian politics in 1966 led to the suspension of the legislature. Thirteen years 
later, democratic rule was restored in 1979 and the legislature renamed as 
“National Assembly.”
19
 Nigeria dropped the parliamentary system and opted for 
the presidential system retaining the bicameral type of legislature. 
Subsequently, the National Assembly only existed for four years after which the 
General Muhammadu Buhari-led military struck and put it under lock and key. 
The current National Assembly was reinstituted in 1999 with the advent of the 
                                               
14  Neirus I. Nwosu, Johnson O. Olaniyi, and Samuel O. Oyedele, An Introduction to 
Constitutional Development in Nigeria (Ibadan: Sunad Publisher Ltd, 1998). 
15  Warisu O. Alli, “Development of Legislative Practice,” in Legislators and the 
Legislature: A Guide for Legislators in Nigeria, ed. Sonni G. Tyoden (Kuru: National 
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 2014). 
16  National Assembly, Nigeria Legislature: 1861-2011 (Abuja: Department of Information 
and Publications, National Assembly, 2010). 
17  National Assembly, Nigeria Legislature. 
18  Goitom, “National Parliaments”; Nwosu, Olaniyi, and Oyedele, An Introduction; National 
Assembly,  Nigeria Legislature. 
19  Ojo, “Nigerian legislature”; Nwosu, Olaniyi, and Oyedele, An Introduction. 
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Fourth Republic and has since witnessed eighteen years of uninterrupted 
legislative activities.  
On the other hand, the institutional framework of the National Assembly 
is as dynamic as its historical development. It changes with the prevailing 
political conditions in the country at one point to the other. At inception, the 
Legislative Council in 1922 was operated as a unicameral legislature with both 
official and unofficial members partly selected, nominated, and elected. The 
membership strength was forty-six (46), out of which twenty-seven (27) were 
official members including the Governor and Lieutenant Governors. The fifteen 
(15) unofficial members included six (6) Nigerians while the remaining four (4) 
were elected with three (3) from Lagos and One (1) to represent Calabar.
20
 Its 
jurisdiction covered only Lagos and Southern Provinces of the country. Its 
power was limited to that of advisory and assistance to the Governor. Section 
27 and 28 of the Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1922 provided 
that members could initiate Bills provided such Bills were not finance-related.
21
 
As a result of the agitation for inclusion of more Nigerians in the 
governance of the country, the institutional framework of the 1946 Legislative 
Council changed in terms of membership composition and legislative 
jurisdiction. The number of official members was reduced to sixteen (16). The 
Governor (Sir Arthur Richard) and Chief Secretary to the Government (Hon. G. 
B. Stooke) among others retained their official membership (National 
Assembly, 2010). Out of the four (4) unofficial members, 3 were directly 
elected from Lagos and 1 from Calabar. The Regional Assemblies were made to 
serve as Electoral College to indirectly elect 20 unofficial members (North: 9; 
West: 6; and East: 5). The legislative jurisdiction of the Legislative Council 
covers the whole country.
22
 Following the renaming of the Legislative Council 
as the ‘House of Representatives’ in 1951, the membership composition 
increased to 7 official members, 136 unofficial members and 6 special members 
nominated by the Governor. The 1954 Lyttelton constitution abolished Electoral 
College and members of the House of Representatives were directly elected by 
the constituents. The membership composition also changed. While the North 
had 92 representatives, the West and East had 42 each. Lagos had 2 
representatives and the Southern Cameroons produced 6 members. There were 
also 3 ex-officio members.
23
 
As part of the arrangement for the 1960 independence, the country 
switched to a bicameral legislature. The 1960 independence constitution granted 
full legislative power to the two chambers. It recognized the Senate as the upper 
chamber with 44 members and the House of Representatives as the lower 
                                               
20  Nwosu, Olaniyi, and Oyedele, An Introduction. 
21  Goitom, “National Parliaments.” 
22  Nwosu, Olaniyi, and Oyedele, An Introduction. 
23  Nwosu, Olaniyi, and Oyedele, An Introduction. 
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chamber with 306 members. The Senators were all nominated with each region 
producing 12 each and 4 selected by the Governor-General on the advice of the 
Prime Minister. On the other hand, the House members were all directly elected 
from their constituencies.
24
 The fact that the 1963 republican constitution 
conferred full political independence on the country did not change the 
institutional framework of the national legislature except for few amendments. 
It retained the parliamentary system and gave more power to the parliament to 
elect the President of the country. The number of the Senate rose to 56 members 
and the House increased by 6 to make it 312-member House of Representatives. 
The First Republic legislature was suspended in 1966 following the first Aguiyi 
Ironsi-led change of government.  
The return to democratic rule in 1979 ushered in the Second Republic. 
The country switched from parliamentary to presidential system as provided for 
in the 1979 constitution. Section 43 of the constitution retained the bicameral 
legislature as named it “National Assembly” which consisted of the Senate and 
House of Representatives. Section 44 – 45 provided that 5 Senators are to be 
elected from each state with 450 members representing the whole country on 
the basis of population. For the first time in the history of the country, the 
legislature is totally separated from the executive and there was a clear 
separation of powersamong the organs of government. However, the National 
Assembly was again put under lock and key following the Buhari-led military 
intervention of 1983. Despite this situation, the 1979 constitution became a 
turning point in the history of legislative politics in Nigeria. The contents and 
provisions of subsequent constitutions (1989 and 1999) were heavily influenced 
by the provisions of the 1979 constitutions except for few amendments.  
The current National Assembly derives its legislative powers from 
section 4 of the 1999 constitution (as amended).
25
 It grants the National 
Assembly the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
the country. However, sections 47 – 89 explicitly provide for the institutional 
composition, framework, and legislative procedures. These range from 
membership composition, legislative procedures, qualification for membership, 
elections as well as powers and control over public funds. In terms of 
composition, section 48 provides that the Senate shall consist of 3 Senators 
from each of the 36 states of the federation and 1 from the FCT, Abuja; making 
a total of 109 members. Section 49 provides that the House of Representatives 
be made up of 360 members representing federal constituencies of nearly equal 
population. Section 50 provides for the leaderships of the two chambers as well 
as the process of their elections and removals.  
                                               
24  National Assembly,  Nigeria Legislature. 
25  Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Lagos: 
Federal Government Printer, 1999). 
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Section 65 and 66 of the constitution provide for the conditions of 
membership qualifications into the National Assembly as well as conditions of 
disqualifications. A prospective candidate for the Senate must have attained the 
age of thirty-five years while that of the House of Representatives is pegged at 
thirty years. Both are required to be citizens of Nigeria and must have been 
educated up to at least School Certificate level; in addition to being member of a 
political party and are sponsored by such parties. Section 66 on the other hand 
identifies a number of grounds by which a person may not be eligible to stand 
for election into the National Assembly. The first condition is that a person who 
had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another country and declared 
allegiance to such a country is not eligible to contest for a seat in the National 
Assembly. Other conditions include if the prospective candidate had been 
declared to be of unsound mind or adjudged to be a lunatic; if he is under a 
death sentence imposed on him by a court of law; and he is in active public 
service (as a civil servant) among others.  
The constitution recognizes the fact that its provisions may not be 
sufficient to cover the legislative procedures of the two chambers. Thus, section 
60 provides that the two chambers shall have the power to regulate its own 
affairs and procedures. It is on this premise that the Senate and the House of 
Representatives enacted for themselves other rules and regulations to guide their 
activities. Prominent among these is the Standing Orders which govern the 
legislative procedures and behaviours of members both within and outside the 
National Assembly. For instance, section 50(1) only provides that a Senate 
President, Deputy Senate President, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House 
of Representatives shall be elected among the members to direct the affairs of 
the National Assembly. However, legislative activities and procedures are much 
a responsibility that could be shouldered by only four persons. Therefore, the 
Standing Orders of both chambers make provisions for the appointment, 
selection, or election of more legislators as Principal Officers. For example, 
Order 7 makes provision for the nomination of members to fill the following 
positions: Majority Leader and Deputy, Majority Whip and Deputy Whip, 
Minority Leader and Deputy, and Minority Whip and Deputy.
26
 For 
administrative convenience, section 51 provides for the recruitment of a Clerk 
and such other staff that may be required for the optimal functioning of the 
National Assembly. It is against this backdrop that the National Assembly has 
three Clerks and several assistants. While the Clerk to the National Assembly is 
the most senior, he is assisted by two other Clerks: the Senate Clerk and House 
Clerk. 
 
                                               
26  National Assembly, Standing Orders of the House of Representatives, Ninth Edition 
(Abuja: House of Representatives, 2016). 
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Examining the Impact of the National Assembly in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic 
 
Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, there have been mixed 
feelings on how the National Assembly has been performing its legislative 
functions.The rate of its effectiveness has been a subject of debate. While some 
people scored the institution high, most people scored it below average. The 
popular notion among Nigerians is that the National Assembly is not effective. 
This position is premised on the generally negative perception of the institution 
which stems out of the perceived endemic legislative corruption that 
characterized the institution since its inception in 1999. The National Assembly 
is scored very low in the performance of its four cardinal functions by 
Nigerians. First, the representativeness function is nothing to write home about 
as the legislators are seen to be representing self-interests rather than the 
interests of their constituents. Secondly, the processing of national budgets has 
not gone without drama since 1999. It is characterized by issues such as of late 
passage, inflating budget provisions of MDAs in conspiracy with the heads of 
the MDAs, budget disappearance, and above all, the 2017 budget padding 
scandal that it yet to be resolved. Anytime the legislators go on oversight, the 
general belief is that they are on a mission to make money for themselves. 
While the legislators are condemned on the three functions, there seems to be a 
different perspective to lawmaking function. 
Between 1999 and May 2019, the Senate has processed 2,482 Bills and 
passed 681 representing 27.4 per centperformance level. On the other hand, the 
House of Representatives in the same period processed the total of 3,514 Bills 
out of which only 928 were passed thus, putting the percentage of Billspassed 
by the House to stand at 26.4 per cent.The breakdown of the lawmaking 
performance is depicted in table 1 for ease of understanding. 
From the table 1, while the huge number of Bills processed is 
appreciable, one may not be out point to score the National Assembly low on 
lawmaking performance given the significantly low percentage of Bills passed 
compared to Bills processed. Though, the current 8
th
 Assembly seems to be 
outstanding by virtue of the fact that it processed and passed the highest number 
of Bills when compared with the previous Assemblies.The Senate processed 
718 Bills and passed 293, while the House processed 1,588 Bills and passed 382 
of same. This is evidence that there is continuous improvement in the 
lawmaking capacity of the National Assembly. However, the issue is not the 
number of Bills passed but their impact of the people. While most of the Bills 
passed were geared toward entrenching good governance, little can be shown 
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for it as Nigerians are still wallowing in the mud of high rate unemployment, 
endemic poverty, economic degradation and high incidences of socio-political 
frustrations. 
Despite the low performance level of the National Assembly, the 
institution gulps significant percent of the country’s overhead cost which the 
former Governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi puts at 25 
per cent;
27
 a figure which the legislators have since refuted. Premised on the 
claim and the counter-argument, there have been several calls on the leadership 
of the National Assembly to publicize the actual remuneration package of 
legislators. However, these calls are yet to be appropriately responded to by the 
National Assembly paving way for several guesstimate analyses on the subject 
matter, thereby leading to the negative public perception of the National 
Assembly as a den of corrupt and self-centered people. 
According to the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission-RMAFC (an institution empowered by section 70 of the 1999 
Constitution (as amended) to determine the salary and allowances of members 
of the Senate and House of Representatives), a Senator is officially entitled to 
N12, 902,360.00 (US$33,442.54)
28
per annum with a once and for all severance 
package of N24, 090,000.00(US$62,440.58). Likewise, a member of the House 
is entitled to N9, 525,985.50 (US$24,691.08) annually as salaries and 
allowances annually with N23, 822,000.00 (US$61,745.93) as a severance pay 
at the end of his four-year tenure.
29
 This shows that about N30, 544,578,080.00 
US$79,170,660.59) is spent on the 469 legislators as salaries, allowances, and 
severance package in four years (excluding estacode and tour duty allowances). 
However, it is widely believed as argued by Amaefule
30
 that the salaries 
and allowances of legislators are not limited to the ones officially stated, rather 
there are others that accrue through self-appropriation and corruption. For 
instance, whiletable 2 above shows that the legislators did not collect 
allocations for constituency projects, Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin disclosed that 
they do collect it which make each member of the House of Representatives 
earns about N10million monthly (US$25,919.71).
31
 
                                               
27  Ben Agande and Inalegwu Shaibu, “National Assembly Expenditure: Sanusi Insists, says 
he’s Ready to quit if…,” Vanguard, December 2, 2010.  
28  The US$ equivalent was calculated at N385.81 to US$1, official rate as at June 2, 2020. 
29  National Institute for Legislative Studies, “Legislators’ Salaries and Allowances: A Cross-
Country Comparison,” accessed on August 23, 2016,http://nils.gov.ng/docs/legislators-
salaries-and-allowances.pdf. 
30  Everest Amaefule, “Senators’ Allowances Nine Times Higher than Basic Pay,” The 
Punch, June 23, 2015. 
31  Femi Adesanya, “House of Representatives Earn N10m Monthly-Abdulmumin Jibrin,” 
Information Nigeria, accessed on November 2, 2016, https://www.informationng.com/ 
2016/10/house-of-reps-members-earn-n10m.html. 
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The position of Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin on the unofficial earnings of the 
legislators is one too many. There are several claims on the guesstimate figures of 
the annual salaries and allowances noted by prominent persons that could not be 
dismissed out-rightly. For instance, Prof. Itse Sagay, who is the Presidential Adviser 
on Anti-corruption, claimed that information available to him shows that a Nigerian 
Senator earns about N29 million(US$75,167.16) a month and over N3 Billion 
(US$7,775,913.00) a year.
32
 The breakdown of the figure shows that the basic 
salary is pegged at N2, 484,245.50 (US$6,439.09) as against the official N2, 
026,400.00 (US$5,252.37) stated by the RMAFC. While the difference in the figure 
seems marginal, there are some that are widely different with some allowances not 
captured by the official pay but claimed to be payable to the legislators by Sagay. 
For example, while the official newspaper allowance is put at N303, 960.00 
(US$787.86) for a Senator and N297,781.00 (US$771.84) for House member, 
Sagay claimed that a Senator gets a whopping N1, 242, 122.70 (US$3,219.55) for 
newspapers annually. In addition, the RMAFC in its official payment breakdown 
did not make provision for hardship allowance; Sagay claimed that a Senator takes 
N1, 242, 122.70 (US$3,219.55) for such. 
In the same vein, another report of the bogus remuneration of the 
legislators worthy of note is the one put forward by the Economic 
Confidential.
33
The NGO claimed that aside from the official remuneration 
packages of the federal legislators, they corruptly appropriate non-regular 
allowances for themselves. The table also shows the overall entitlements of the 
principal officers of both chambers. Despite public outcry and press triggering 
the Freedom of Information Act in this regard, the National Assembly refuses to 
publicly declare the actual salaries and allowances of the legislators.  
It is interesting to note that the legislators have on several occasions 
continued to refute the claims but little is done to absolve the institution of the 
alleged scandalous remuneration. After several requests that the National 
Assembly publish its financial dealings, the Senate President ordered the 
breakdown of the budget of the legislature to be published online. However, the 
breakdown did not show precisely how much each legislator earns. In reaction 
to the open challenge once made by the Governor of Kaduna State, Nasir El-
Rufai that the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Rt. Hon. Yakubu 
Dogara should make the details of the National Assembly’s N115 Billion 
(US$298,076,665.00) budget public, the Speaker published his pay slip for six 
                                               
32  Taiwo-Hassan Adebayo, “Senate, Sagay at War again over Lawmakers ‘Jumbo’ Pay,”Premium 
Times, September 7, 2017, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/ headlines/ 242661-
senate-sagay-at-war-again-over-lawmakers-jumbo-pay.html. 
33  Economic Confidential, “Official Remuneration Packages and Non-regular Allowances 
for Federal Legislators in Nigeria,” accessed on October 28, 2017, https://economicconfidential. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Economic-Confidential-Remuneration-Legislators-
PDF2.pdf. 
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months which shows that he receives N402,500 (US$1,043.27) monthly.
34
 The 
authenticity of the pay slip is questionable on the ground that the official 
remuneration as fixed by the RMAFC as his entitlement as a House member 
(excluding his allowances as a principal officer) is more than what was shown.    
 
 
Argument in Favour of Discarding or Reforming the National 
Assembly as Nigeria’s National Legislature 
 
Despite the indispensability of the legislature in a democracy, it may not 
be out of point to consider the position of the people clamouring for the 
scrapping or complete overhaul of the National Assembly in Nigeria’s 
democratic process. Their position is unconnected to the actions and/or 
inactions of the Nigerian legislators which are widely seen as affronts to good 
governance and inimical to the country’s democratic survival. The most 
prominent out of the many issues of this school of thought is the high cost of 
running the institution. The National Assembly gulps between N115 to N120 
billion (US$298,076,665.00 to US$311,036,520.00) yearly with little or nothing 
to show for the huge budgetary allocation in term of the institution’s impact on 
the well being of Nigerians. The budget has consistently been pegged at N150 
billion (US$388,795,650.00) annually despite the fact that the country is faced 
with devastating revenue shortfall as a result of sliding oil prices since 2014. 
While the country is currently facing economic hardship and infrastructural 
deficit, the National Assembly is gulping a huge amount that is sufficient 
enough to fix a substantial infrastructural gap to make life better for Nigerians. 
The annual budget of the institution which has 469 members and legislative 
aides, civil servants, and other support staff of less than 1, 600 personshas an 
annual budget that is bigger than the budgets of 19 states in Nigeria.
35
 
Similarly, taking the official remuneration package by RMAFC, 
Nigerians are also not comfortable considering the days of working vis-à-vis the 
pay. The Nigerian constitution states that each chamber must sit for a minimum 
of 181 days in a year. This means that the chambers will make 724 sittings in 
their 4-year tenure. A Senator receives an average of N104, 557.24 
(US$271.01) per sitting, N313, 671.72 (US$813.03) in one week and N1, 
254,686.88 (US$3,252.11) in a month; an amount no Professor can make in two 
                                               
34  Jacob S. Olatunji, “Dogara Replies El-Rufai, Releases Payslips for 6 Months,” Nigerian 
Tribune, April 11, 2017. 
35  Ibanga Isine, “National Assembly’s Huge Allocation Higher than Individual Budgets of 
19 States,” Premium Times, May 28, 2015, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/ 
news/headlines/183784-national-assembly-huge-allocation-higher-than-budgets-of-19-
states.html. 
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months. On the other hand, a member of the House receives an average of N85, 
533.07 (US$221.70) per sitting, N256, 599.21 (US$665.10) weekly and N1, 
026,396.84 (US$2,660.39) monthly; an amount that can be used to pay the 
monthly salaries of about 35 graduate civil servants in a State in Nigeria.
36
 
The legislators are also condemned on the grounds that they usually fail 
to read the public mood before taking decisive legislative actions. For instance, 
on December 2, 2015, a Bill calling for the censorship of the use of social media 
sponsored by Senator Ibn Na’Allah scaled through the second reading. The Bill 
proposed a two-year jail term or option of N4 million fines for anybody found 
to have abused the use of social media.
37
 It took a series of public outcries and 
outrage reactions from Nigerians before the Bill was stepped down. It is widely 
acknowledged that the electoral victory of the APC-led government in the 2015 
general election was unconnected with the adoption and use of social media. 
The concern is that on what moral and political ground could such government 
attempts to censor the use of the same social media when such is used to expose 
its lack of responsiveness and dereliction of duties, especially of the National 
Assembly. Another issue of the same trajectory is the ongoing legislative 
consideration of a Bill to regulate NGOs in Nigeria which many people in all 
spheres of life have condemned.
38
 The Bill seems to be an attempt by the 
National Assembly to enact a law that will enable the government to control and 
undermine the operations of the NGOs thereby suppressing any form of 
criticism and dissident views on government’s activities. 
The call for scrapping the National Assembly is also thick on the grounds 
that the legislators are found guilty of pursuing selfish personal interest at the 
expense of Nigerians. A case in point was the purchase of utility vehicles for 
lawmakers despite the economic recession that eclipse the country’s economy. 
The House of Representatives used about N6.1 billion to buy new Peugeot 508 
cars at N17 million (US$44,063.51) per unitfor all the 360 members.
39
 On the 
other hand, the Senate bought 36 Toyota Land Cruiser VXR V8 at 36.5 million 
                                               
36  Saliu and Bakare, “An Assessment of the performance of the 7th National Assembly in 
Nigeria,” Paper presented at the National Conference on the Dynamics of Democratic 
Practice in Nigeria, 1999-2015, organized by Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic 
Research and Training, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano on November 9-10. 
37  Monjola Sotubo, “Social Media Bill: Nigerians Express Anger at Senate’s Plan to Censor 
Twitter, Facebook others,” Pulse, December 3, 2015, http://www.pulse.ng/news/local/social- media-
bill-nigerians-express-anger-at-senate-s-plan-to-censor-twitter-facebook-others-id4420926.html. 
38  Premium Times, September 7, 2017, “NGO Regulation Bill Threatens Nigeria’s Hard-
won Democracy, Academics, Experts, others Warn,” accessed on December 29, 2017, 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/242640-ngo-regulation-bill-threatens-
nigerias-hard-won-democracy-academics-experts-others-warn.html. 
39  Samuel Ogundipe, “While Nigerians Groan under Recession, Lawmakers buy N6.1 
billion Cars,” Premium Times, August 8, 2017, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/ 
news/headlines/239538-nigerians-groan-recession-lawmakers-buy-n6-1-billion-cars.html. 
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(US$94,606.94) per unit amid a biting recession.
40
 In this regard, the legislators 
are also seen to be living a flamboyant live and engaging in senseless spending 
on luxury properties amid high incidences of poverty among the people in their 
constituency. For example, Senator Dino Melaye, representing Kogi West 
Senatorial district recently bought a Rolls Royce estimated to cost about N180 
million (US$466,554.78) and also possessed about 28 of such expensive cars.
41
 
The bandwagon effects of the 2012 scrapping of the Senegalese Senate 
and the post of the Vice-President to reduce the cost of governance;
42
 and the 
“yes” vote to scrap the upper chamber in Mauritania in 2017
43
 also contributed 
immensely to the call for similar action in Nigeria. The call became weighty 
when government functionaries started leading the agitation. For instance, the 
sitting Governor of Ekiti State, Kayode Fayemi and Senator Rochas Okorocha 
(APC- representing Imo West Senatorial District) shared the view and argued 
that the best form of legislature that foster development in Nigeria is the 
unicameral legislature.
44
 Over the years, this call has gained momentum to the 
extent that some even called for the conversion of legislative job to part-time 
basis where the elected legislators will be meeting occasionally and get paid 
based on the number of sittings.
45
 
While the Buhari-led executive enjoys the support and sympathy of 
Nigerians in its course to bring development to the country, the many 
incidences of needless confrontations and excessive politicking by the National 
Assembly also pitch the institution against the people. Most Nigerians see the 
8
th
 National Assembly as serving as opposition to the executive despite 
belonging to same political party. Unlike the mutual relationship that existed 
between the David Mark-led National Assembly and Goodluck Jonathan-led 
executive, the Bukola Saraki-led National Assembly is seen to be antagonistic 
                                               
40  Samson Ezea, “National Assembly: Car Purchase Palaver and the National Grazing 
Reserve Bill,” The Guardian, April 23, 2016, https://guardian.ng/features/national-
assembly-car-purchase-palaver-and-the-national-grazing-reserve-bill/. 
41  Goodness Adaoyiche, “Lawmaker Buys N180m Rolls Royce Despite Economic 
Recession,” Pulse, October 6, 2016, http://www.pulse.ng/news/local/dino-melaye-
lawmaker-buys-n180m-rolls-royce-despite-economic-recession-photo-id5574084.html. 
42  Senegal Parliament votes to scrap Senate. Vanguard, September 13, 2012, available 
online at: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/09/senegal-parliament-votes-to-scrap-
senate/, accessed June 2, 2020. 
43  Mauritania votes to abolish Senate by referendum. Aljazeera, 7 August, 2017, available 
online at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/mauritania-votes-abolish-senate-
referendum-170807003416088.html, accessed June 2, 2020. 
44  Samson Adenekan, “Fayemi calls for scrapping of Senate,”Premium Times, October 10, 
2019, available online at https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/356963-
fayemi-calls-for-scrapping-of-senate.html, accessed June 2, 2020. 
45  Seye Olumide, “Why we advocated part-time legislature, restructuring,” The Guardian, 
13 August 2018, available online at https://guardian.ng/politics/why-we-advocated-part-
time-legislature-restructuring/, accessed May 25, 2020. 
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in nature to all Buhari-led executive’s decisions bringing about a mutual 
suspicion and cold executive-legislative relations. Nigerians see the National 
Assembly as a den of corruption as a result of its refusal to confirm the 
appointment of Ibrahim Magu as EFCC Chairman because more than half of the 
legislators are said to be under corruption-related charges.   
Other reasons advanced for the calls to scrap the National Assembly 
include but not limited to legislature’s misconception of its power limits, 
dereliction of duties, high rate of legislative absenteeism at plenary, usurping 
the power of the executive, engaging in wasteful spending, and duplication of 
roles by the bicameral nature of the legislature among others.     
 
 
Argument in Favour of Retaining the National Assembly as 
Nigeria’s National Legislature 
 
Not minding the actions and inactions of the National Assembly as 
perceived by the anti-National Assembly school, the second school of thought 
believes that the institution should be retained on the following grounds. First, 
the National Assembly in most difficult periods of Nigeria’s political 
development rose to expectation by intervening on critical issues to save the 
country from plunging into political crises. Notable in this regard is the 
constitutional gap in the 1999 constitution with regard to when the Vice 
President can become Acting President in the event where the President did not 
transmit letter on such to the National Assembly. In 2010, the ailing President 
Umar Musa Yar’Adua was incapacitated and flown abroad for treatment 
without transmitting a letter to the National Assembly to enable the Vice 
President Goodluck Jonathan becomes the Acting President. This was in 
contradiction to section 145 of the 1999 constitution (as amended). The country 
was enmeshed in political confusion with a Vice President who could not 
command obedience from the members of the cabinet and could not wield 
presidential power on strategic issues such as assenting to Appropriation Bill to 
become budget. At this period, governance in the country was in disarray with 
the fear of military takeover not out of insinuations and permutations. 
Consequently, on February 9, 2010, the two chambers of the National Assembly 
passed the “Doctrine of Necessity”, a resolution to empower the Vice-President 
to act as the President; dousing the political tension that engulfed the country. 
The utility of the Doctrine stems from the fact that it validates the extra-
constitutional issue necessary to preserve political stability in the country.
46
 
                                               
46  Sahara Reporter, “The Doctrine of Necessity in Perspective,” February 13, 2010,  
http://saharareporters.com/2010/02/13/doctrine-necessity-perspective, accessed on 
December 29, 2017. 
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The National Assembly’s symbolic depiction of the existence of 
democracy in Nigeria is yet another reason adduced in support of the National 
Assembly as an important institution too weighty to discard. It serves as the only 
avenue that avails Nigerians the opportunity to participate in governance by 
giving voices to all tribes regardless of the size, geographical location and 
economic status among other social cleavages and complexities. While the 
executive as an institution of governance is very far from the people, the National 
Assembly brings governance closer to the people at the grassroots through 
constituency-legislative relations and accessibility to lawmakers through 
submission of petitions, requests and input into government decision making 
process. Whether this representativeness function is performed effectively is 
another issue of discourse, but the fact that the legislature makes provision for it is 
enough to be seen as indispensable in Nigeria’s democratic process. 
There have been a series of agitations against the 1999 constitution as a 
result of contradictions of provisions as well as obsolete provisions that no 
longer suit the prevailing socio-economic and political situations of the country. 
If not for the input of the National Assembly through its continuous 
amendments to the constitution, Nigeria could have been engulfed in 
constitutional crises capable of truncating the hard-earned democracy. In 
addition, elections in Nigeria since inception have been marred with 
controversies, irregularities, and consequential high number of litigations. The 
National Assembly hason many occasions since 1999 rose above expectation to 
amend the Electoral Act in response to prevailing needs especially with regard 
to the Supreme Court’s stand about the place of the card reader and PVCs as 
legal instruments of election. 
The fear of the National Assembly has been the source of executive’s 
wisdom in entrenching good governance in Nigeria. There were instances where 
the legislative checks on other arms of government especially the executive 
have avoided democratic tyranny in the country. For instance, Nigeria could 
have ended up in a similar situation that engulfed Burkina Faso (in October 
2014) earlier in 2007 when President Olusegun Obasanjo attempted to elongate 
his tenure. While average Nigerians continued to mount resistible pressures, it 
took the irresistible effort of the National Assembly to throw out the “third term 
agenda” thereby sustaining and consolidating Nigeria’s nascent democracy. In 
view of this, the watchdog function of the National Assembly is weighty 
enough to be considered in retaining the institution.  
Other reasons advanced in favor of retaining the National Assembly 
include but not limited to the utility of its four cardinal functions of lawmaking, 
representation, oversight, and budgeting to entrenching good governance in the 
country, the timely passage of resolutions in aid of people hit by natural and 
manmade disasters and aversion of contingencies, among others. 
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Factors Responsible for the Negative Public Perception of the 
National Assembly in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 
 
The discussion so far pointed to the fact that several factors affect the 
National Assembly which, consequently, makes it to be the weakest link in 
Nigeria’s democratic process. These include but are not limited to the following: 
i. low impact of the enacted Acts on the lives of the people and the country in 
general; 
ii. dereliction of duty especially by unproductive legislators who see the 
National Assembly as means to make economic and political gains; 
iii. poor working relations between the legislature and the executive, 
characterized by mutual suspicion leading to hegemoniccontestations and 
power struggles; 
iv. lack of appropriate mediating mechanisms to address the impasse caused 
by the incessant frictions between the arms of government; 
v. wide negative public perception of the legislature leading to a damaged 
institutional image as a result of the over-condemnation of bad actions and 
the criticism of good actions; 
vi. the secrecy of the complete emolument of the Nigerian legislatorsdespite 
public outcry to make it public; 
vii. the nonchalant attitude of legislators to the negative public image; 
viii. Public display of flamboyant spending on luxury things and purchase of 
expensive properties; 
ix. weak enforcement and sometimes non-implementation of legislation, 
motions and resolutions as a result of unhealthy executive-legislative 
relations; 
x. high prevalence of corruption-related actions of the legislators who were 
alleged to be demanding for financial benefits from MDAs to approve their 
budget or during oversight functions; 
xi. internal power struggle and personality rivalry among members mostly 
brought about by the circumstances of seniority status, individual socio-
economic status, party identification (whether ruling or opposition), 
constituency status (whether representing a rural, urban or mega city 
constituency), individual behavioral and personality traits, religious and 
ethnic identification among others; and 
xii. the challenge of local politics that usually pitch the state governor against 
the federal legislators, thus becoming national issues. A good example is 
the feud between the Governor of Kogi State, Yahya Bello and Senator 
Dino Melaye.  
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What ought to be Done? Arguments for Safeguarding the 
National Assembly but Modifying its Rules 
 
As enormous as the challenges facing the National Assembly are, it is our 
position that if all cannot be mitigated, the basic ones should be given utmost 
priority especially those that will impact directly on the people. For example, the 
legislators are expected to be effective in making laws and passing resolutions and 
motions that solve the challenges of the basic needs of the people. While we admit 
that the process of lawmaking is energy-sapping, time-consuming, tedious and 
cumbersome, accelerated consideration should be given to bills, motions and 
petitions on issues such as food, shelter, security, education, and economy. 
Second, the Nigerian legislators ought to be susceptible to issues affecting 
Nigerians at home and in Diaspora. The recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa, 
migrant killing and burying in France without recourse to Nigerian government’s 
directives, slave trading of Nigerians in Libya, farmer-herdsmen clashes, militancy in 
the Niger-Delta, serial kidnapping in the country, and resuscitated Boko-Haram 
attacks, among others, should be front-burner issues of discourse in the National 
Assembly and not triviality issues that currently enjoy legislative attention. 
Third, one expects that the complete remuneration of the legislators be made 
public. If perceived to be high, the legislators should work hard to justify being 
entitled to such pay. The legislature can take a cue from the recent declaration by the 
Vice President, Prof. Yemi Osinbajo that the N1.7m and N1.5m salary packages for 
the President and Vice President respectively aretoo small compared to the magnitude 
of duties they do. Nigerians reacted positively to it by clamouring for increase of their 
salaries because they believe the President and Vice President are working tirelessly 
in the course of promoting good governance in the country. 
Furthermore, the legislators are not in any race for trophies for 
continuous confrontations and bickering with the executive. Therefore, they are 
expected to collaborate and work as development partners with the executive in 
repositioning the country, especially by passing the budget on time without any 
form of controversy such as budget padding and other practices that could derail 
the executive from bringing the dividends of democracy to the people. 
Finally, the legislature is encouraged to step up in the performance of 
their duties, reconcile with their constituents to bring about a robust legislative-
constituent relations, and make their activities much open to the public. By 
doing this, the people will be conversant with legislative activities thereby 
appreciating their work and efforts at engendering good governance in the country. 
 
 
The Nigerian National Assembly: To Be or Not To Be? 
 
The paper has successfully examined the utility of the National Assembly 
in the democratic process in Nigeria. Using the parameters of indispensable 
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functions of the legislature and the institution’s impact in entrenching good 
governance in the country, the paperargued that the functions of the National 
Assembly are too important and central to democratic process to be 
downplayed. On the other hand, the paper shed light on the problematic of 
retaining and managing the institution especially with regard to the cost of 
running the institution. It achieved all the stated objectives set out under the 
introductory section. Based on the significance of the legislative roles and its 
institutional relevance in engendering good governance and its strategic place in 
the democratic process, we opine that the National Assembly is too weighty to 
be discarded. We admit that there are numerous issues (as identified above) that 
need to be addressed; however, the National Assembly as an institution is 
needed for smooth governance. Since the National Assembly is an institution 
that transcends the live span on individuals, the institution should be retained as 
it is. If the past and present legislators are misbehaving, Nigeria could be lucky 
to have good people to inherit the institution perhaps in the 9
th
 Assembly and 
make good use of the opportunity provided by the National Assembly to the 
benefits of Nigerians.  
 
Table 1: Summary Presentation of Bills Processed in the National Assembly, 1999 to May 2019 
 Senate  House of Representatives 
 
Bills 
Received 
Bills 
Passed 
% of 
Bills 
Passed 
Bills 
Received 
Bills 
Passed 
% of Bills 
Passed 
4th Assembly  
(1999 - 2003) 250 64 25.6 325 103 31.7 
5th Assembly  
(2003 - 2007) 446 129 28.9 343 168 49 
6th Assembly  
(2007 - 2011) 477 72 15.1 503 152 30.2 
7th Assembly  
(2011 – 2015 
 
591 
 
123 
 
20.8 
 
755 
 
123 
 
16.3 
8th Assembly  
(2015 – 2019)  
 
718 
 
293 
 
40.8 
 
1,588 
 
382 
 
24.1 
Total 2,482 681 27.4 3,514 928 26.4 
Source: Authors’ computation with data from NILS, Ndoma-Egba, Nda-Isaiah, Saliu and Bakare, 
Odey, Jimoh. See National Institute for Legislative Studies, 14 Years of Lawmaking in the 
Nigerian National Assembly, 1999-2013: An Analysis of Bills Processed (Abuja: NILS, 2013); 
Victor Ndoma-Egba, “Seventh Senate passed 123 Bills,” Premium Times, June 4, 2015; Jonathan 
Nda-Isaiah, “Senators who made 7th Senate Tick,” Leadership, June 29, 2015; Hassan A. Saliu 
and Adebola R. Bakare, “An Assessment of the Performance of the 7th National Assembly in 
Nigeria,” paper presented at the National Conference on the Dynamics of Democratic Practice in 
Nigeria, 1999-2015, organized by Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training, 
Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano on November 9-10, 2016; Odey, K., “X-Raying 
Legislative Agenda of the 8th House of Representatives,” Leadership, June 9, 2017; 
AbubakarJimoh, “8th National Assembly from a critical assessment,” CISLAC Publications, June 
10, 2019, available on line at http://cislacnigeria.net/the-8th-national-assembly-from-a-critical-
assessment/, accessed on September 29, 2019. 
